Guardiola's 4-2-4: John Stones and 5 + 5
The Spanish coach's latest tactical development is a 4-2-4 formation with no full-backs and a central defender, John Stones, who sometimes lines up as a defensive midfielder. Here is an attempt to explain the Man City coach's approach and logic, as he sets his sights on his ultimate dream against Inter in Istanbul.
Getting the ball out, changing pace and defensive transition: universal objectives
Whatever the system or the way a team is organised, certain objectives are common to all coaches around the world.
The aim of the initial offensive organisation, the ball out, is to reach the opponent's half, or to eliminate the opponent's first 2 lines, forcing him to retreat as a block, otherwise he will be completely off balance.
When an attacking player is found one (or rather 2) notch(s) higher, behind the midfield or at the back of the opposing defence, we can talk about a change of pace.
The transition from attack to defence is also the subject of a search for balance (more or less successful) on the part of every coach on the planet.
These two fundamental areas of collective skill (attacking well, and remaining balanced in the event of a loss) in addition to the defensive phase as such, are at the heart of Guardiola's system choices and his choice of men.
They may come as a surprise at first (Akanji left-back, Stones defensive midfielder, etc.) but they are justified by a very down-to-earth approach: optimising the profiles and performance of each role, in all phases of the game.
No more under-qualified staff for any job
4-4-2, 4-3-3, 3-2-5... While these numerical combinations may evoke the same thing for two militants of the same party, they only give a fragmentary vision of the coach's objective through this layout, represented in pre-match.
In reality, as shown above, a team's 10 outfield players could be divided into two groups: Ball movers and pace setters.
5 + 5
At Barcelona, Dani Alves, a full-back in the defensive phase, was (sometimes...) a winger in the attacking phase. In the 5-5 formation described above, he would belong to the second group.
Busquets went from being a defensive midfielder to a defender via the eternal "between the centre-halves" stall. So, if Barça lost the ball during this initial process of preparing for the change of pace, it was not impossible to find the spindly pivot in the position (and with the prerogatives, in a hurry) of a central defender. This inevitably led to mishaps and counter-attacking goals against tricky opponents.
At Bayern, Guardiola did more research into developing other attacking schemes. The 2-3-5 system was identified, and profiles such as Alaba and Bernat could be found in the attacking line (the 2nd 5) with the ball.
Other very agile but frail profiles, such as Thiago, belonged to the first 5, the ball-winners. With the ball and (therefore) also without it, at the moment of defensive transition.
Ideal for initiating actions and joining the other group of 5. Problematic for managing a defensive transition against a team equipped to counter-attack.
A full-back in the defensive phase, Bernat exploded defensively against Atletico in 2016.
Hearts made of Stones, will never break
This information will be interpreted in different ways by different people depending on their sensibilities: Guardiola will want to put an end to a 12-year drought in Istanbul.
Of course, there has always been something missing from winning the Champions League, despite having the resources to do so. And it was always the reaction to a loss, or the defensive work, that hurt.
Unstable in the face of Falcao and Mbappe in 2017, cut to pieces by the explosiveness of Salah in 2018, City have since continued to improve defensively and in maintaining balance.
Until the state of grace against Neymar and Mbappe's PSG in 2021, when the Citizens, organised in a 4-4-2 formation without the ball, were denied a single shot in the final hour of the first leg.
Against Real last year, Guardiola came close to pulling off the perfect coup by relying on the same defensive set-up, which is still in use today and is based on very basic principles.
So close, so far... A ball from Mason Mount for Havertz in 2021, another from Camavinga for Benzema in 2022: City cracked twice too many and their continental glory went up in smoke.
Each time, in one way or another, a full-back with more attacking characteristics (Zinchenko in 2021 / Cancelo in 2022) loses control of depth.
Two profiles that have been pushed towards the exit in recent months.
When City defend today, we find Walker - a more defensive full-back - and Akanji or Ake (trained centre-backs) at left-back and right-back.
On paper, Stones is the other central defender joining Ruben Dias to form this ultra-solid back4, which will remind some of the 'choose position' option in the days when controllers needed a wire to connect to consoles. CB - CB - CB - CB.
Guardiola's approach is simple: the "ball movers" are now all ultra-competent players defensively. Rodri and the 4 mentioned above
Depending on how their opponents were organised, City organised themselves to be concrete without the ball and when they lost it.
The players Walker and Akanji target with the ball (in other words, the players whose pressure they attract/provoke) are the same ones they will recover if they lose it.
Against Arsenal, who only had two miserable shots until 2-0 up, Akanji didn't do anything crazy against Saka, and City never attacked without the Englishman being under the watchful eye of the Swiss, or under total control of Ruben Dias.
There was no Stones in midfield here, and we took the ball out in a 4+2 formation, in the hope of fixing all the midfielders and Arteta's forwards, before finding the killer pass to play a 4-on-4, or even a 2v2 between Haaland - De Bruyne and the pair of centre-backs.
Against Real, a different kind of opposition organisation (4-3-3/often low blocks) called for a different kind of ball control from City. The aim was the same: a solid transition.
Madrid defended in 433. 4-1-2-3. To Real's 2-3, Pep opposes a 3-2. If you look at City's average positions, you can see Real's 4-3-3 married to City's 3-3-4. Which means that there is no real numerical superiority. The important thing is that every Madrid player has a reference point. A player who picks him up when City lose the ball.
Real's block is so low that City don't really need a numerical superiority. On the other hand, with Kroos, Valverde and Modric, Real have two choice gunners to launch their counter-attacks, and a devastating left winger. The aim is to prevent the ball being put in play.
It's a good idea to put the most capable men on the field for this task. That's why Stones is in the middle. With Stones and Rodri on their heels, it's hard for Modric and Valverde to get their hands on the first few balls.
Vinicius, Rodrigo and Benzema were chased down (depending on where the ball went) by Walker, Dias or Akanji.
In theory, Rodri and Stones would have to deal with Valverde and Modric losing the ball. You can see that Walker is very attentive to Vinicius JR and takes his run.
The main thing was elsewhere for City: Real did not exist on the counter-attack.
In Inter's 3-1-4-2 formation, it is Hakan Calhanoglu (natural 10) who occupies Stones' rose with the ball.
Guardiola wanted to avoid situations in which the Turk (number 10 by training) had to turn into a defender, such as when Leao was alerted just before half-time of the return leg.
Forwards attack come full circle
By entrusting the width, which is ultimately a form of fixation and therefore a threat to the opposition's back line (i.e. not the first two, the job of the ball movers), to pure attackers like Grealish or Mahrez (pace setters) Guardiola is following a clear approach: everyone in their place, doing what they know how to do.
- 5 "ball movers", all defensively competent: Walker - Dias - Akanji + Stones - Rodri
- 5 rhythm changers: 2 "spreaders" (more or less wide, that's another vast subject): Mahrez/Bernardo - Grealish - 3 "finishers" (in any case in charge of the last/pre-last move): De Bruyne - Haaland - Gundogan.
6 in the defensive phase, the German is indeed an attacker with the ball. In a way, he doesn't have what it takes to manage the defensive transition against opposing forwards.
Based on this model, some of the adjustments may seem far-fetched.
They simply correspond to the defensive/offensive patterns and asymmetries of the opposition.
Guardiola switched from a pure 4-2-4 against Arsenal to a "3-1-1-1-4" against Real, with the same desire: to get the ball out well and to be in control when losing.
A five-time champion of the best league in the world in six years, he seems to have an answer for everything, especially when it comes to manoeuvring a low block, which Inzaghi's Inter have mastered to perfection.
With the likes of Walker and Nathan Ake - enough of a central defender to defend, enough of a full-back to combine or cross - alongside Ruben Dias, he gave himself the option of dangerous crosses from the restarting base / front 5, while his opponents intelligently went on a high pressing strike, defending with 8 or 9 outfield players almost on top of each other.
Guardiola - the embodiment of a technical, technological and material modernity - continues to amass information and innovations to force his destiny, and gives life to the utopia of a perfect balance between a model of play and logical adjustments to the opponents' characteristics.
The Istanbul final was the crowning achievement of this frantic quest, which has been going on for 10 years, and the Catalan's appointment to Bavaria.
